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Abstract 
This paper presents a novel perspective on the force-content distinction against the 
background of truthmaker semantics and an ontology of attitudinal objects, entities that we 
refer to as ‘claims’, ‘beliefs’, ‘requests’, ‘offers’, ‘desires’, ‘hopes’, and ‘decisions’ and that 
are neither acts (or states) nor propositions. Attitudinal objects incorporate illocutionary force 
or attitudinal mode and come with various sorts of satisfaction conditions, reflected in the 
applicability of different satisfaction predicates. Various linguistic generalizations support the 
view that attitudinal objects, rather than propositions, play a central role in the semantics of 
attitude reports. Making use of Fine’s (2017, 2018a, b) recent truthmaker semantics, the paper 
outlines an account of force/mode in terms of conditions on the satisfiers of attitudinal objects 
or on attitudinal objects themselves. Those conditions concern the type of entities that may act 
as satisfiers (situations, actions, states, (assertoric) attitudinal objects), the presence or absence 
of violators, causal connections between attitudinal object and satisfiers, and, importantly, the 
direction of fit. The paper gives a novel account of the notion of direction of fit, motivated by 
the actual readings of the predicate correct when applied to attitudinal objects or their 
satisfiers: an attitudinal object with a word/mind-world direction of fit is associated with an 
intrinsic (non-action-guiding) norm (that of truth); attitudinal objects with a world-word/mind 
direction of fit impose an action-guiding norm or a purpose on potential satisfiers.  
 
Introduction 
Standard views in philosophy and formal semantics center around the notion of a proposition, 
an entity needed, or so it appears, to fulfill several functions at once: being the meaning of 
(declarative) sentences (and that-clauses in particular), being the (primary) bearer of truth,  
being the shareable object (or content) of propositional attitudes and of illocutionary acts. The 
availability of apparent propositional anaphora and quantifiers such as that, something, and 
everything as well as free relatives like what Mary claims in place of that-clauses seems to 
confirm the status of that-clauses as referential terms and thus the objectual status of 
propositions. Propositions are standardly seen as separate from force: different illocutionary 
act types (with different forces) can have the same propositional content, as can different 
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propositional attitudes (with different attitudinal modes). In order to avoid the too coarse-
grained notion of content associated with the conception of propositions as sets of possible 
worlds, it has become common in philosophy of language, to adopt a structured conception of 
propositions. The structured-propositions view leads to the notorious problem of the unity of 
the proposition, however. This is the problem, how, for example, the structured proposition 
<the property of being happy, John> can be true or false and have the particular truth 
conditions it is meant to have, namely to be true just in case John is happy, rather than, say, 
John being distinct from happiness. A solution to the problem that has been pursued recently 
consists in giving up the force-content distinction and taking illocutionary acts to be acts of 
predication applying to the propositional constituents, thus providing the unity and the truth-
evaluability of the propositions (Hanks 2015). 
     In this paper, I outline a very different view, which does away with the notion of a 
proposition as an entity and avoids the problem of the unity of the proposition while 
subscribing to a fine-grained notion of content. On that view, propositions do not play a role 
as entities fulfilling the various functions at once. That-clauses do not act as proposition-
referring terms, and pronouns and quantifiers like that and something and free relatives like 
what John believes do not stand for propositions. The starting point instead are the kinds of 
objects that correspond to illocutionary acts and propositional attitudes, namely what we refer 
to as claims, beliefs, judgments, requests, promises, intentions, desires, hopes, and decisions. 
These are what I call ‘attitudinal objects’.
1
 Attitudinal objects divide into illocutionary objects 
(claims, requests, promises etc.) and mental objects (beliefs, judgments, intentions, decisions, 
hopes etc.). Closely related to attitudinal objects are modal objects, which include obligations, 
permissions, abilities, options, possibilities, strategies, and laws. Attitudinal objects are 
extremely well-reflected in natural language, but they are of course not dependent on 
language. Attitudinal objects are mind- and agent-dependent particulars and are bearers of 
truth conditions or more generally satisfaction conditions. I take them to be bearers of 
truthmakers or satisfiers, namely situations or actions that exactly satisfy the attitudinal 
object, in the sense of Fine’s (2017, 2018a, b) notion of exact truthmaking. Truthmaker 
semantics, which based on that notion, allows for a fine-grained notion of content associated 
with both sentences and attitudinal objects. 
     Attitudinal objects come with a force (illocutionary objects) or mode (mental objects), 
though they are not actions. Satisfaction predicates including truth predicates do not apply to 
                                                            
1 See Moltmann (2003a, b, 2013, chap. 4, 2014, 2017, 2019). 
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acts, but rather to attitudinal objects, and different satisfaction predicates apply to different 
types of attitudinal objects, reflecting, at least in part, their mode or force. True and false 
apply to beliefs, assumptions, and claims; comply with, violate, and contravene to requests 
and commands; fulfill to promises, desires, and hopes, accept and take up to invitations, 
suggestions, and offers, carry out and realize to intentions and decisions, take and follow to 
options and strategies. Given the notion of an attitudinal object, force or mode can be cast in 
terms of conditions on the satisfaction of attitudinal objects, involving actions, situations, and 
attitudinal objects as satisfiers. 
     In what follows, I will first recall the standard view of propositions and the force-content 
distinction, then present challenges to that view from research in linguistics, and finally 
outline the new view based on attitudinal objects and their satisfaction conditions. 
 
1. The standard view of propositions and the content–force distinction  
 
The standard view, since Frege, is that propositions are entities that act as semantic values of 
that-clause complements of attitude verbs and provide arguments for the attitudinal relation 
expressed by such verbs. This gives rise to the relational analysis of attitude reports and 
illocutionary acts reports as in (1b) for (1a):  
 
(1) a. John believes that S. 
     b. believe(John, the proposition that S) 
 
That-clauses, on that view, are proposition-referring terms, with propositions being both 
meanings of sentences and the object or content of propositional attitudes and illocutionary 
acts.  
      Pronouns like that and quantifiers like everything and free relatives like what Mary 
believes , ‘special’ quantifiers or pronouns, as I call them, appear to stand for just the sorts of 
things that-clauses denote, propositions: 
 
(2) a. Mary believes that. 
      b. John believes everything Mary believes. 




     There are two standard views of what propositions are: sets of worlds and structured 
complexes consisting (in the simplest case) of a property and an object (structured 
propositions). The structured-propositions view has become a more widely adopted view 
among philosophers since it avoids problems with the possible-worlds view such as the 
identification of logically equivalent propositions. On either view, propositions are taken to be 
independent of force, providing the semantic values of embedded sentences in various 
contexts, including as antecedents of conditionals and as disjuncts of sentential disjunctions. 
 
2. Linguistic challenges of the standard view 
 
The standard view appears well-motivated by what the linguistic facts seem to bear on their 
sleeve; yet the view that embedded clauses stand for force-independent propositions has been 
challenged by recent and not so recent research in both syntax and semantics.   
      First, embedded clauses may be associated with different semantic types, associated with 
different forces. In particular wh-clauses correspond to the semantic types of questions (I 
asked how tall John is) and exclamations (I am amazed how tall John is), rather than 
propositions, and those different semantics types are selected by different clause-embedding 
predicates (Grimshaw 1979). In formal semantics, interrogatives are generally taken to have a 
different denotations from declaratives and that-clauses (Hamblin 1958, Karttunen 1977). 
Also imperatives have been taken to have a different denotations from declaratives, e.g. as 
properties as opposed to propositions (Portner 2007). In addition to different sentence types, 
mood and modals occurring in the embedded may be indicative of force. Depending on the 
force or mode of the described event, the verb may require a particular mood or the presence 
of a modal in the embedded clause, and, vice versa, mood or modals may require particular 
embedding verbs. Thus, request, which selects directive force, requires a that-clause to be in 
the subjunctive mood or else to contain a modal like should (‘modal concord’, Portner 2007): 
 
(4) a. ??? John requested that Bill is at work by 8. 
     b. John requested that Bill be at work by 8 / that Bill should be at work by 8. 
 
Thus that-clauses may not stand for force-free propositions, but indicate the type of force 
selected by the verb. 
    There have also been various arguments to the effect that that-clauses do not syntactically 
behave like referential terms, but as predicates of content bearers, which may come with a 
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force (Moulton 2015, Moltmann 2014, 2017). First, there are views according to which that-
clauses are in fact relative clauses, given the syntactic behavior of complementizers such as 
that (Kayne 2010, Arsenijevic 2009). As such, that-clauses would modify a silent noun (such 
as silent fact) or a noun that has subsequently been incorporated into an underlying light verb 
such as have or make (with believe being derived from have belief and claim from make 
claim) (Arsenijevic 2009, Moltmann 2021). Second, the ability of that-clauses of modifying 
nouns (the belief that S) is indicative of a semantic status of clauses as predicates rather than 
arguments (Moulton 2015).  
      There is also strong evidence that special quantifiers and pronouns do not actually stand 
for propositions, but rather for concrete content bearers that incorporate a force or mode. First, 
quantifiers like something in place of that-clauses take restrictions that could not be 
predicated of propositions, such as difficult to comply with (John requested something difficult 
to comply with) (Moltmann 2003a, b, 2013 chap.4). Second, reports of content sharing 
involving different attitude verbs are subject to constraints that indicate that what is shared is 
(kinds of) content bearers that include a force (Moltmann 2003a, b, 2013, chap. 4). Thus, 
attitude verbs that involve different forces or modes generally cannot share their content: 
 
(5) a. ??? John hoped what Mary claimed, that it would rain. 
     b. ??? John imagined what Mary claimed, that it was raining. 
      c.???  John decided what Mary predicted, that he would return. 
(6) ??? John promised what Mary suspected, that he would return. 
 
Only under special conditions are such sentences acceptable, namely when the described 
attitudes are coordinated or allow, under focusing, for a lexical decomposition in syntax, into 
attitudinal modifier and more general predicate (John in fact promised what Mary only 
imagined, John knows what Mary only suspects). The standard view has it that free relative 
clauses such as what John hopes stand for a force-free content; but the fact that reports of 
sharing such as (5-6) are unacceptable or require special linguistic contexts or efforts on the 
part of the interlocutors means that that view is mistaken. The unacceptability of (5a, b) and 
(6) matches the unacceptability of corresponding sentences with nominalizations: 
 
(7) a. ??? John’s hope is Mary’s claim. 
      b. ??? John’s imagination is Bill’s claim. 
      c. ??? John’s decision is Mary’s prediction. 
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      d. ??? John’s promise is Bill’s suspicion. 
 
Standard views have it that nouns like claim and decision are polysemous standing either for a 
proposition or an act. The unacceptability of examples like (7-8) again shows that that view is 
mistaken since those examples should be fine on the proposition-reading. 
        Observations such as these indicate that propositions do generally not figure as entities in 
the semantics of sentences. Instead what plays a role is just the sorts of entities we refer to as 
‘John’s claim that S’, an attitudinal object, or ‘the claim that S’, a kind of attitudinal object 
sharable by different agents. Attitudinal objects are concrete mental or illocutionary objects 
that depend on a particular agent; yet they generally come with satisfaction conditions. They 
form kinds on the basis of being the same in content (provided they share their force or mode) 
and thus kinds of attitudinal objects are suitable for the role of sharable contents (Moltmann 
2013 chap. 4, 2017, 2019). Some attitudinal objects are (non-material) products of acts, in 
roughly the sense of Twardowksi’s (1911) distinction between actions and products.
 2
 Thus 
assertions are products of acts of asserting, thoughts, products of acts of thinking, requests 
products of acts of requesting, and questions products of acts of asking. Attitudinal objects are 
closely related to modal objects, entities like obligations, permissions, possibilities, which 
likewise have satisfaction conditions. Modal objects may generally endure past the act that 
may have set them up, attitudinal objects only if they have a modal component. Thus, a 
demand may involve an obligation, an assertion a commitment to truth. 
     Without this being a place for a detailed linguistic discussion, the linguistic generalizations 
above give support for a rather different semantics of attitude reports than the standard 
relational one. Such an analysis will start out with attitudinal objects and that-clauses acting 
semantically as their predicates, so that a simple attitude report such as (8a) will be interpreted 
as in (8b): 
  
(8) a. John claims that S. 
      b. make(John, the claim that S) 
 
The semantic analysis of (8a) as (8b) is plausible given recent syntactic views on which (8a) 
has an underlying structure as indicated in (9), involving the light verb make and movement 
                                                            
2 Products here are best understood the sense of abstract artifacts of Thomasson (1997), which for her include 
laws - modal objects. See Moltmann (2017, 2019) for a clarification of the notion of an attitudinal object in 
relation to Twardowksi’s action-product distinction 
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of the noun claim from a position (the specifier position of a force projection FP) inside the 
that-clause to the direct object position of the verb and subsequent incorporation into the verb 
(Arsenijevic 2009, Moltmann 2021): 
 
(9) a. John claimi-make ei [CPthat [FPei [F’v [IPS]]]]. 
 
The force-projection F’, based on a force feature v, will denote a property of attitudinal or 
modal objects, which will semantically compose with the denotation of claim in its original 
position in the specifier position of the force phrase, yielding the same denotation as that of 
claim that S. 
      That-clauses act as predicates of attitudinal (and modal) objects by giving, at least, their 
satisfaction conditions. The satisfaction conditions of attitudinal objects are best cast in terms 
of truthmaker semantics as recently developed by Fine (2017, 2018a, b), rather than possible-
worlds semantics. There are three reasons for that. [1] Sets of worlds as contents of attitudinal 
objects give a too coarse-grained notion of content. [2] Sets of worlds would not be able to 
distinguish attitudinal (and modal) objects with the modal force of necessity and the modal 
force of possibility (Moltmann 2020). [3] Truthmaker semantics allows casting certain 
conditions of force as conditions on actions and attitudinal objects as satisfiers of (other) 
attitudinal objects (Section 5). Truthmaker semantics has a range of motivations mainly from 
the sort of intensionality arising in non-attitudinal contexts such as conditionals and deontic 
modals. The possibility of casting force in terms of conditions on truthmakers/satisfiers and 
falsifiers/violators (Section 5) gives new motivations for it. 
 
3. Attitudinal objects as bearers of truth and satisfaction conditions 
 
Attitudinal objects come with satisfaction conditions, which divide into truth conditions and 
fulfilment conditions. Attitudinal objects such as claims and assumptions have truth 
conditions; attitudinal objects such as requests and promises have fulfillment conditions. I 
take satisfaction conditions not to consist in conditions under which an attitudinal object is 
true satisfied in a world, but in conditions under which possible or actual (or even impossible) 
situations or actions verify or satisfy the attitudinal object, in the sense of exact truthmaking 
or satisfaction of Fine’s (2017b, 2018a, b) recent truthmaker semantics. That is, situations or 
actions verify or satisfy an attitudinal object such as a claim, assumption, request, promise, 
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intention, or decision just in case they are wholly relevant for the satisfaction of the claim, 
assumption, request, promise, intention, or decision.  
       Truthmaker semantics posits as the meaning of declarative and imperative sentences not 
just a set of truthmakers (satisfiers), but also a set of falsifiers (violators) (Fine 2017, 2018a, 
b).  In Fine’s truthmaker semantics, the notions of exact truthmaking or satisfaction and of 
falsemaking or violation play a central role, though applied to declarative and imperative 
sentences. The very same notion, however, carries over to attitudinal (and modal) objects. A 
rudimentary truthmaker view of mental states and mental and illocutionary acts can in fact 
already be found in Searle (1983), who takes intentions, decisions and requests to be satisfied 
by actions and assertions and beliefs to be satisfied by states of affairs. One important feature 
of truthmaker semantics is that it is ontologically neutral: any entity can in principle play the 
truthmaker role, as long as it serves the overall purposes imposed by the semantics. Situations, 
actions, as well as attitudinal objects (as answers) play a role as truthmakers or satisfiers of 
attitudinal objects, and attitudinal objects may require particular types of satisfiers or impose 
particular conditions on it (Section 5). This is a major difference of the present approach to 
possible-worlds semantics. 
     Truthmaker semantics is an alternative to the unstructured conception of propositions 
based on possible worlds. It gives a more fine-grained notion of content, providing a notion of 
partial content and a notion of subject matter.
3
 
    Truthmaker semantics when applied to attitudinal and modal objects differs in one 
important respect from sentence-based truthmaker semantics: not all attitudinal and modal 
objects have falsifiers/violators. Claims and assumptions do have as falsifiers, namely 
situations in virtue of which they are false (situations completely relevant for the falsity of the 
claim). In a more obvious way, requests have violators, actions that violate or ignore the 
request. However, attitudinal objects with the modal force of possibility do not have falsifiers/ 
violators: a proposal, invitation, offer or permission cannot be violated.  
      A sentence S as a predicate of attitudinal or modal objects can be assigned a single 
meaning that takes that into account, namely the property that holds of an object d just in case 
d has the same satisfiers as S, and, if d has violators, d shares the same violators as S 
(Moltmann 2021a): 
 
                                                            
3 Given truthmaker semantics, John believes that Mary is happy does not entail John believes that Mary is happy 
and 2 is prime. Truthmaker semantics as such does not deal with the mode of presentation problem, though. But 
see Moltmann (2021a) for a proposal. 
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(11)  Truthmaker-based meaning of sentences as predicates of attitudinal or modal objects 
         For an (imperative or declarative) sentence or clause S, 
         [(that) S] = λd[pos(d) = pos(S)  & (neg(d) ≠ Ø   neg(d) = neg(S))]. 
 
Here pos(d) is the set of satisfiers and neg(d) the set of violators of an attitudinal or modal 
object d. (11) does not yet take into account the semantic difference between declaratives and 
imperatives, which I will come to shortly. 
     The very same sentence meaning in (11) is applicable to modal objects of different flavors 
and forces, giving rise to a novel semantics of modal sentences based on an ontology of modal 
objects (Moltmann 2017a, 2020b). The difference between having and not having violators is 
also reflected in the applicability of satisfaction predicates. Attitudinal and modal objects can 
be ‘fulfilled’ or ‘complied with’ only if their modal force is that of necessity rather than 
possibility. Proposals, permissions, offers, and invitations cannot be ‘fulfilled’, but only 
‘taken up’ and an invitation may be ‘accepted’. In addition, predicates of violation are 
inapplicable to objects like invitations, permissions, offers, and proposals. Obligations can be 
violated or contravened, and rules or laws can be broken. Offers and invitations can be 
declined or refused, but that does not amount to a violation, but a refusal of acceptance 
(satisfaction). The predicate ignore conveys violation with requests and obligations; but with 
invitations, offers, and permissions it conveys simply failure of satisfaction. What we refer to 
as ’options’, ‘strategies’, and ‘possibilities’ are teleological modal objects of possibility. They 
can be ‘taken’ or ‘pursued’, but not ‘violated’. A strategy may fail, of course, but here failure 
is a property of the attitudinal object, not its satisfier. An option may be rejected, but that 
means not taking it, rather than violating it. 
     Also actions of satisfying permissions, offers, and invitations are evaluated differently 
from the satisfiers of requests and obligations. Whereas actions can be called ‘correct’ when 
they satisfy a request or an obligation, actions of taking up a permission, offer, or invitation 
could only be considered ‘legitimate’, rather than ‘correct’ (see Section  5.2.).  
 
4. The unity of the proposition problem 
 
The attitudinal objects theory displays some similarities with recent act-based conceptions of 
propositions, in particular the view endorsed by Hanks (2015, 2018) on which propositions 
are conceived as types of acts of predication, predication in the assertoric, directive, or 
interrogative way (Hanks 2015, 2018). The present approach shares with that approach, the 
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use of types or kinds of cognitive particulars for the role of propositions as truthbearers and 
shareable content bearers.
4
 Moreover, it makes use of entities that come with a force, 
displaying truth conditions, fulfilment conditions or answerhood conditions. However, the 
motivations are otherwise quite different. First of all, attitudinal objects are not acts. Acts do 
not have truth or satisfaction conditions (Twardowski 1912, Ulrich 1976, Moltmann 2013 
chap. 4, 2017, 2019, Davis 2020). By contrast, entities like claims, requests, and questions, 
the products of acts do, as do entities like rules, beliefs, and intentions, which are not 
generally the products of acts.
5
 Second, it is not just attitudinal objects that have satisfaction 
conditions, but also modal objects. Modal objects include rules and weak permissions and 
obligations, which are not generally created by acts of predication (a rule may come about by 
habit rather than fiat; weak permissions and obligations need not result from an act of giving 
or imposing them). 
     Hanks’ view rests on the assumption that propositions, in the sense of structured 
propositions, are what sentences stand for. If propositions are taken to be structured 
propositions (say sequences of an (n-1) place property and individuals), this raises the 
problem of the unity of the proposition: how can such a sequence be true or false and have the 
particular truth conditions it is meant to have? On Hank’s proposal, assertoric, directive or 
interrogative forces is construed as properties of predicative acts, acts that provide the unity of 
the propositions and its truth, fulfilment, or answerhood conditions.   
     The present approach is radically different: sentences come with a truthmaker-based 
content (i.e. (11)) which, when predicated of an attitudinal or modal object, gives its truth or 
satisfaction conditions, that is, the conditions under which a possible situation or action 
satisfies the attitudinal or modal object. The semantics does not have to deal with the issue of 
how attitudinal objects get their truth or satisfaction conditions: they are mind-dependent 
objects, and it is a matter of the philosophy of mind to account for the intentionality of the 
mental, not of semantics. The source of the problem of the unity of the propositions resides in 
the view that propositions are entities that are both the meanings of sentences and truth 
bearers, a view that is problematic both philosophically and linguistically.  
                                                            
4 This accounts for one difficulty for the standard notion of a proposition as abstract objects, its graspability. 
5 A rule may come about by habit; a belief may be an implicit belief, thus not the result of thinking; an intention 
precedes the corresponding intentional act, rather than being created by it (Searle 1983). 
11 
 
     The structured-propositions view has also been motivated by the need to have a more fine-
grained notion of content than the possible-worlds-based one. On the present, truthmaker-
based approach, content is fine-grained and a structured notion of content is not needed.  
 
5. Forces as conditions on the satisfaction of attitudinal objects 
 
Attitudinal objects do not come with a force-content distinction: attitudinal objects comprise 
both those that come with truth conditions (beliefs, claims) and those that come with 
fulfilment conditions of various sorts (reflected in the applicability of different predicates of 
satisfaction). Since propositions do not play a semantic role as objects, attitudinal objects 
should not be taken to be composed of a proposition and a force. Force can instead be 
accounted for in terms of conditions on the satisfiers of attitudinal objects as well as on the 
attitudinal object itself. In what follows, I first propose conditions of force distinguishing 
traditional categories of speech acts: constatives (assertives), directives, questions, now 
considered illocutionary objects. Then I briefly turn to other distinctions among attitudinal 
objects that are reflected in the applicability of different predicates of satisfaction. I will leave 
it for another occasion to address the question of what distinctions are reflected otherwise in 




     To an extent, conditions on force involve conditions on the sorts of things that can be 
satisfiers of the attitudinal objects.
7
 There are different views what the aim (and thus 
satisfaction) of an assertion consists in. On the Gricean view, it consists in the addressee 
having a belief (and constatives thus being directives). On Searle’s (1969) view, the 
illocutionary point of an assertion that S is the speaker’s commitment to the truth of S. The 
latter certainly matches the notion of an assertion as an attitudinal object better:  assertions 
have truth conditions, with their truthmakers/falsifiers being situations. Questions have 
answerhood conditions rather than truth conditions. This means their satisfiers are attitudinal 
objects that are constatives.  Directives are generally taken to have as their satisfiers actions 
                                                            
6 There is a debate, which needs to be set aside in the present context, as to what extent forces should be 
considered the content of sentence mood (McGinn 1977).   





on the part of the addressee.
8
 However, this does not generally hold. Imperatives such as Have 
a nice day or Get well soon have satisfiers that are states or events involving the addressee. 
This is unproblematic on the present approach: an attitudinal object to have both actions and 
states or events as satisfiers.  
     The distinction among different forces or modes does not just consist in differences in the 
types of possible satisfiers. What plays a central role in the distinction between having truth 
conditions as opposed to fulfilment or answerhood conditions is the notion of the directions of 
fit, a notion that originally had been applied to mental states (Anscombe 1957) and later to 
speech acts as well (Searle 1969, 1983, Humberstone 1992).  Truth conditions go with a 
word/mind-world direction of (i.e., the representation needs to fit the world); fulfillment 
conditions with a world-word/mind direction of fit (i.e., the world needs to match the 
representation). The notion of a direction of fit can now be considered a property of attitudinal 
and modal objects. An assertion, assumption, or belief has a word/mind-world direction of fit 
(and thus truth conditions). A requests, demand, promise, desire, hope, offer, or permission 
has a ‘world-word/mind-direction of fit’ (and thus fulfilment conditions).   
     The notion of direction of fit, quite apparently, is a normative notion, imposing 
requirements either on the representation or the world. As such, it shows a striking connection 
to the applicability of the predicate correct to attitudinal objects or their satisfiers.
 9
 The 
relevant observation is that correct applies to all attitudinal objects with a word/mind-world 
direction of fit, conveying truth and only truth.
 10
 By contrast, it does not apply with a single 
reading to attitudinal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit, though it can apply to 
the satisfiers of such attitudinal objects, conveying satisfaction. Let us start with correct 
applying to attitudinal objects with attitudinal objects with a word/mind-world direction of fit: 
 
(12) a. John’s belief that S is correct. 
                                                            
8   There is much less of a correlation between forces and embedded sentences. As we have seen, that-clauses 
can give the content of both assertions and requests, depending on mood or the presence of a modal. Embedded 
interrogatives may give the content of questions (Mary asked who came), inquiries (Mary wondered who won), 
knowledge (Mary knows who won) and assertions of a sort (Mary announced who won). Infinitives often serve to 
characterize directive attitudinal objects whose satisfiers are actions, but not generally so (John expects to be 
healthy). This is a serious difficulty for Hanks (2015), who must assume a strict correlation of sentence types 
with force.   
 
9 In what follows it is important to truly pay attention to linguistically reflected intuitions, setting aside 
philosophical preconceptions about what correctness amounts to. 
10 See also Stalnaker (1984: p. 80) as well as Humberstone 1992: 71). Stalnaker took the applicability of correct 
conveying truth to be a characteristic of ‘acceptance attitudes’. 
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       c. John’s claim that S is correct. 
       b. Bill’s guess / speculation / impression is correct. 
       d. Mary’s answer / hypothesis / assumption is correct. 
 
In natural language, correct when applied to a belief or assertion conveys just truth, whether 
or not the belief or assertion is justified or warranted (Moltmann 2021b). Correct in fact 
applies with the same reading to guesses, speculations, and impressions, which by nature do 
not require justification or warrant. Correct furthermore applies to answers, hypotheses, and 
assumptions just in case they convey a truth, whether or not they are ‘good’ answers, 
hypotheses, or assumptions. Correct when applied to attitudinal objects with a world-
word/mind direction of fit thus does not concern itself with other norms than truth; these are 
reserved for the application of evaluatives like good.
11
  
      It is plausible that correct has a single normative meaning: correct holds of an object o 
just in case o fulfills the norm (or standard of correctness) that is associated with o or that is 
relevant in the context. The way correctness is understood when applied to beliefs, assertions, 
guesses, hypotheses, answers, and assumptions means that truth is treated as the one intrinsic 
norm associated with attitudinal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit. Other types 
of objects that correct applies to are associated with other norms, e.g. grammaticality for 
sentences and laws or moral values for punishments. 
     Correct sharply distinguishes between actions and attitudinal objects that may be their 
products. A punishment may be correct, but the act of punishing may have been performed 
incorrectly. Similarly, an assertion or assumption being correct does not entail the act of 
asserting or assuming being correct (or the making of an assertion or assumption being 
correct). The latter may be correct because they follow an instruction or order (the relevant 
contextually given norm), not because they capture or maintain a truth.
12
  
      Truth as a norm is not an action-guiding norm, but rather can be understood as a 
                                                            
11 Some philosophers impose further epistemic conditions on the correctness of beliefs or assertion (e.g. 
Williamson 2000). That does not seem to match linguistic intuitions regarding the applicability of correct:  it is 
not possible for an assertion to be true while also being incorrect (because unjustified). Interestingly, true is 
hardly acceptable with guesses, speculations, impressions, and assumptions, noted by independently by 
Humberstone (1992: 71) and Moltmann (2021b). This indicates that when applied to attitudinal objects, it is true 
that implies warrant rather than correct. (This does not hold, of course, for the notions that philosophers may 
have in mind when using the nouns truth and correctness.) 
12 See also (Humberstone 1992: 68), who points out that one can hold a false (incorrect) belief, yet not make a 
mistake holding it. 
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teleological norm, that is, a purpose or function, constitutive of a representational object, as 
Jarvis (2012) has argued. Correctness in that sense applies to artifacts in just the way it applies 
to mental states, as Jarvis made clear), which in the present context means it applies to non-
material products of acts (assertions, assumptions)  just as it applies to beliefs (which are not 
generally products of acts.
13, 14
 
       The word/mind-world direction of fit as a property of attitudinal objects can now be 
formulated as follows, where < is the part-relation holding among situations: 
 
(14) Word/mind-world (WM-W) direction of fit 
        An attitudinal object o has a word-world direction of fit just in case o is associated with a  
       constitutive norm n and satisfies n in a world w iff there is a situation s, s < w, that makes  
         o true. 
 
    Let us then turn to the second observation:  correct does not convey satisfaction when 
applied to attitudinal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit, but only when applied 
to their satisfiers
15
. A request cannot be ‘correct’ (in the sense of being satisfied), but an 
action meant to satisfy the request might be. Illocutionary objects with a world-word/mind 
direction of fit impose a norm on actions performed in response to them, but they are not 
themselves subject to a norm that is constitutive of them. They may be subject to other norms 
of course. For example, a request may be considered correct because it complies with a 
standard of making a particular type of request; a desire may be correct because it is 
appropriate to have it. But directives are not subject to a single norm that is constitutive of 
them. Instead they impose an action-guiding or regulative norm on potential satisfiers. 
Restricted to illocutionary objects, the world-word direction of fit can thus be cast as follows: 
                                                            
13 When normativity is linked just to actions, truth would then be taken to be constitutive of the norm associated 
with believing, by imposing the condition ‘if one ought to believe p, then p’ (Boghossian 2003, Gibbard 2003). 
Such conditions on adopting or maintaining a belief are problematic, however (Glüer and Wikforss 2009). Truth 
is not the aim of believing in the sense in which the fulfillment of moral values is what certain types of actions 
and decisions should aim for.  The norms for actions of adopting or maintaining a belief may simply be a 
contextually given norm. 
 
14 Not only correct conveys truth (and only truth) with beliefs and assertions, but also other normative 
predicates, for example right and, for falsehood, wrong, as do corresponding predicates in other European 
languages. This supports the generalization that predicates of correctness convey truth and just truth when 
applied to attitudinal objects that have truth conditions. 
 
15 Jarvis (2012) takes correctness to also apply to intentions. However, intentions could only be correctly 




(15) World-word/mind (W-WM) direction of fit for illocutionary objects 
       An illocutionary object o has a world-word direction of fit just in case any action a  
       performed in response to o satisfies the norm imposed by o in a world w iff a is part of w  




(15) is not yet fully general. Most importantly, it does not apply to attitudes like desires and 
hopes, which also come with a world-word/mind direction of fit, but do not always require 
as satisfiers actions, which could be subject to a performance-guiding norm (I hope / wish 
that I will win).
17
 Hopes and desires, implying a positive emotive response to their 
satisfaction (under normal circumstances), impose a requirement or norm on the future 
course of the world, with the emotive response constituting a kind of purpose to be attained 
by a relevant part of the future course of the world. I will have to leave it with these 
proposals and remarks on the notion of direction of fit; a more in-depth discussion and 
comparison with other approaches will have to be left to another occasion.
18
  
   A characterization of the standard notions of constatives (assertives), directives and 
questions viewed as illocutionary objects can now be given as follows: 
 
(16) a. An illocutionary object is a constative in case it has a WM-W direction of fit and its  
            verifiers and falsifiers are situations. 
        b. An illocutionary object is a directive in case it has a W-WM direction of fit and its  
           verifiers (falsifiers) are actions or states of the addressee. 
       c. An illocutionary object is a question in case it has a W-WM direction of fit and its   
          verifiers are constatives. 
 
These distinctions could not simply be carried over to the great variety of mental objects 
with their various modes and satisfaction predicates. Here still other parameters may be at 
play. Thus, intentions and decisions, which are generally taken to involve a world-
                                                            
16 ‘In recognition of’ is meant to capture Searle’s (1983) point that only actions by way of satisfying a request or 
intention can satisfy the request or intention. 
17 Note that correct does not apply to their satisfiers of desires, decisions, intentions, and hopes, is seems, 
because the latter do not impose a social norm to be recognized as such by the interlocutors. 
18 See, for example, Humberstone (1992), for a non-normative account of direction of fit, in terms of controlling 
intentions that accompany attitudes.  Jarvis (2012) associates a constitutive norm both with beliefs and desires. 
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word/mind direction of fit, are not ‘fulfilled’ or ‘complied with’, but rather ‘carried out’ or 
‘realized’ or, in the case of decisions, perhaps ‘implemented’ or ‘executed’.  What may 
play a role for the selection of such predicates of satisfaction is a much closer, direct causal 
connection between the attitudinal object and its satisfier than in the case of requests, 
hopes, and desires.  
      While attitudinal objects do not come with a content-force distinction, there is a sense in 
which attitudinal objects of different forces may share their content, namely if they share the 
same satisfiers. Such a notion of content will be relevant when accounting for when attitudinal 
objects of different forces bear logical relations to each other (e.g. an assertion that S is an 
answer to the question whether S, a decision to do X produces an intention to do X). Yet that 




The paper has addressed the force-content distinction from the point of view of a novel 
semantics of attitude reports and independent sentences in which an ontology of attitudinal 
objects takes center stage. Various linguistic facts indicate that force-free propositions do not 
actually play the role in the semantics of attitude reports that they are standardly taken to play. 
Rather attitudinal objects play a central role, though not as semantic values of that-clauses. 
That-clauses rather act as predicates of attitudinal objects, with conditions on force being 
imposed by the embedding verb as well as possibly mood and modals occurring in the clause. 
Likewise independent sentences act as predicates of attitudinal objects, more specifically 
locutionary objects, with sentence mood restricting the sorts of illocutionary objects of which 
they may hold. 
     Making use of truthmaker theory allows for a fine-grained notion of content for attitudinal 
objects and permits formulating conditions of force in terms of conditions on their 
satisfaction. Different conditions on force and the corresponding differences among 
satisfaction predicates reflect the presence or absence of violators, different ontological types 
of possible satisfiers, norms or purposes imposed on attitudinal objects or potential satisfiers, 
as well as causal connections to satisfiers. Such conditions could hardly be formulated within 
a possible-worlds conception of content. Rather they support a truthmaker approach, with 
situations, actions and attitudinal objects being able to act as satisfiers or violators of 
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